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BOND’S  BREACHES
Edward T. Swaine*
Bond v. United States1 illustrates a new maxim for today’s Supreme Court:
hard cases make no law at all.  To be sure, Bond’s bottom line was not particu-
larly difficult.  Few outside the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had great
enthusiasm for using the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act2 (Chemical Weapons Convention or Convention) as a basis for prosecut-
ing Carol Bond, who had used chemicals (some stolen from work, some pur-
chased on Amazon.com) in an attempted revenge on her husband’s lover.3
And there was evident reluctance in the judiciary about turning this tabloid-
ready case—which the Chief Justice, dubiously, called “unremarkable”4—
into a precedent-setting referendum on the scope of the treaty power.  Ini-
tially, the Third Circuit held, unconvincingly, that Bond lacked standing to
raise a constitutional challenge.5  After the Supreme Court reversed,6 the
Third Circuit held against Bond on the merits,7 and the Supreme Court ago-
nized as to whether it should take up the case again.8
But the Supreme Court ultimately did take the case, and once it did, it
became hard to decide—at least in terms of the rationale.  Although the Jus-
tices all favored reversal and dismissal of the indictment, they wound up pro-
viding little clarity on the larger questions the case raised.  Chief Justice
Roberts, for the majority, attempted to avoid any constitutional issue by hold-
© 2015 Edward T. Swaine.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor, George Washington University Law School.
1 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
2 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2012).
3 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.  The revenge was limited in its ambitions.  As the Court
reported, “It is undisputed . . . that Bond did not intend to kill Haynes [her husband’s
lover].  She instead hoped that Haynes would touch the chemicals and develop an uncom-
fortable rash.” Id.
4 Id. at 2083.
5 United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2009).
6 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
7 United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012).
8 The case was reportedly relisted seven times before certiorari was granted. Supreme
Court Grants Certiorari in Case Implicating Missouri v. Holland, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 432, 432
(2013); see also Bond v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013) (granting certiorari).
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ing that Congress did not intend for the Act to apply.9  Justices Scalia10 and
Thomas,11 writing separately, would instead have endorsed two significant
constitutional objections to the Act.  But only Justice Thomas’s objection
attracted the support of a third Justice (Justice Alito, who wrote briefly in
support).12
If, as the more time-honored homily goes, hard cases otherwise make
bad law, making little bad law was hardly the worst outcome.  Nevertheless,
what the Justices proffered was pretty bad.  As explained in Part II, Bond’s
opinions mused about what they considered a potential constitutional
breach: the gap between the national government’s typical authority over
domestic matters, on the one hand, and the domestic authority it might
assert while implementing treaties, on the other.  If tolerated, the basic argu-
ment went, such a gap would breach the constitutional commitment to a
national government of limited authority.  Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,
moreover, voiced concern that the federal government would actively exploit
that gap.  The problem, on their view, was not merely that treaties, like stat-
utes, might occasionally breach a reserve of state authority; rather, treaties
would be differentially exploited by the national government precisely for
that reason.  Each of the Court’s opinions tried to establish a means by which
the judiciary could prevent that from happening.
The real problem was that none of the nine Justices offered any counter-
narrative.  The majority did say that the statute in question was not a suffi-
ciently overt attempt to trench on state prerogatives, but that was cold com-
fort: Chief Justice Roberts’s exertions at statutory construction had little
broader appeal (Justice Scalia, who did nothing to hide his distaste, reasona-
bly doubted that other statutes would be subjected to such “gruesome sur-
gery”),13 and also offered little hope of aligning the international and
domestic authority of the United States.  As Part III indicates, the Court
should have acknowledged the other forms of breach it was ratifying.  The
most obvious is the risk of jeopardizing U.S. compliance with its international
obligations, contrary to constitutional principles designed to reduce that risk.
By focusing on the prospect that the national government will exploit inter-
national opportunities to expand its authority—or at best, per the Chief Jus-
tice, that Congress legislates with the same attitude toward state and local
authority that it always does—the opinions failed to provide the kind of com-
prehensive account that could guide the political branches and future courts.
I. THE POST-HOLLAND TERRAIN
The grant of certiorari in Bond followed resurgent anxiety over the per-
ceived gap between the national government’s authority over domestic mat-
9 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093–94.
10 Id. at 2094–102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
11 Id. at 2102–11 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
12 Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
13 Id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ters and its potential authority over such matters in the wake of an Article II
treaty. Missouri v. Holland14 had long ago established two propositions: first,
that the United States has constitutional authority to enter into treaties relat-
ing to matters not falling within Congress’s enumerated powers;15 and sec-
ond, that in the event such a treaty is non-self-executing and requires
statutory implementation, Congress can—if it would not otherwise possess
the authority to adopt such a statute—rely on the Necessary and Proper
Clause.16
The salience of Holland’s holdings depends, naturally, on the number
and nature of U.S. treaty obligations.  But it also depends on the breadth of
Congress’s purely domestic authority.  As the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged, its case law on this latter question has ebbed and flowed.17  Its most
recent drift—after the Court overruled National League of Cities and in turn
stopped relying on the political safeguards of federalism18—has been to rein-
vigorate the judicial role in policing Congress’s domestic authority.  Most
recently, opinions in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(NFIB)19 suggested without clearly deciding that further inroads might be
made.20  These jurisprudential shifts, rather than any treatymaking boom,
revived the relevance of Holland.21
Bond was an obvious, yet obviously flawed, vehicle for assessing this situa-
tion.  The case involved an attenuated use of a treaty-implementing statute in
an area of traditional state competence; because the United States had
decided in the lower courts not to invoke the Commerce Clause as a basis for
the Act,22 everything was made to rest on the treaty power and the Necessary
and Proper Clause.  It was like a law school exam hypothetical, drafted—
replete with absurd facts—to focus on an infrequently isolated issue.  It cer-
tainly had all the liabilities of that form.  The government’s concession below
did not appear to be based on any genuine conviction that the Commerce
14 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
15 Id. at 432–35.
16 Id. at 432.
17 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–59 (1995).
18 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985) (over-
ruling Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968))).
19 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
20 In that case, five Justices appeared to agree that the Commerce Clause failed to
authorize the Affordable Care Act. See id. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at
2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  Lower courts have expressed
uncertainty about whether the Court’s fractured decisions established binding precedent,
and how that might be read, and generally distinguished any precedent that might have
been established. See, e.g., United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2013);
United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 641 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012).
21 See generally Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 403, 415–23 (2003) (noting contemporary bases for reviving challenges to Missouri
v. Holland); id. at 415 (“[H]istory suggests that it may be vulnerable whenever it proves
relevant.”).
22 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014).
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Clause was irrelevant,23 which meant that the relative scope of unassisted
domestic authority and treaty-based authority—whether and to what extent
the treaty took advantage of some gap—could not be fairly tested or fully
understood.  Nor (unlike Holland itself) was the treaty even arguably
designed to circumvent the limits of domestic authority, such as might have
created a cautionary tale for future undertakings.
Perhaps mindful of these limitations, the majority failed even to attempt
a recalibration in the case law, disappointing those who hoped for something
more revolutionary.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for himself and five
others, invoked the principle that constitutional holdings should be avoided
if other grounds for decision are available.24  The majority then held that the
Act did not cover Bond’s assault, because Congress failed to provide a suffi-
ciently clear indication that it intended to encroach on the police power of
the states.25
Justice Scalia, joined in his statutory analysis by Justices Thomas and
Alito, rejected the majority’s redemptive reading of the Act, necessitating
consideration of its constitutional basis.26  There a slight schism emerged.
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and for Justice Thomas, opined that the Act
was unconstitutional because even if the Convention was valid, Congress
lacked the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement
it.27  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, but also by Justice Alito, would
have limited the treaty power itself, on the basis that it was restricted to agree-
ments that stuck to legitimate international matters and avoided purely
domestic matters like Bond’s.28  Justice Alito summarized his view
separately.29
II. BREACHING DOMESTIC RESTRAINTS
A. The Phantom Menace
By and large, the majority treated any divide between treaty-enabled and
domestic authority as hypothetical.  Chief Justice Roberts expressed doubt
that the Convention actually required prosecution of someone like Bond,
23 As suggested by the government’s unsuccessful attempt to revive the argument in
the Supreme Court, during which it explained that the prior strategy had been based on
the mistaken assumption that the statute could only be defended on grounds expressly
invoked by Congress. See Brief for the United States at 18–26, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No.
12-158).  Another possible explanation was that the Commerce Clause jurisprudence was
equally unsettled, and the government would not have wanted Bond to generate adverse
precedent that might haunt the Affordable Care Act.  One might doubt the wisdom of that
decision, given that the Commerce Clause came to naught in NFIB, but might have
mooted the petition in Bond.
24 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.
25 Id. at 2087–94.
26 Id. at 2094–97 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
27 Id. at 2098–102.
28 Id. at 2102–11 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
29 Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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though he did not rest on that basis.30  Instead, he reasoned, “the statute—
unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with principles of federal-
ism inherent in our constitutional structure.”31  Those principles required
avoiding anything that would “dramatically intrude[ ] upon traditional state
criminal jurisdiction,” or “affect[ ] the federal balance,” “[a]ffect a significant
change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdic-
tion,” or “render[ ] traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for federal
enforcement and . . . also involve a substantial extension of federal police
resources.”32  In Bond’s own gloss, these principles fueled not just the reac-
tion to statutory ambiguity, but also its detection in the first place.  Each, it
seemed, being motivated by “the improbably broad reach” of the statutory
definition, “the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless
reading,” and “the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context
from the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism.”33
Justice Scalia critiqued this approach with trademark vigor, but its merits
are less important than its consequences.  By the majority’s lights, the ques-
tion presented by the petition—whether the Act parlayed a treaty obligation
into an unconstitutional extension of Congress’s legislative authority—did
not need to be answered.  At some points, the Court seemed interested in
what Congress actually intended to regulate.34  At other times, it looked like
a clear statement rule, asking instead that Congress overcome the intent
established for it by virtue of the rule itself.35  The point in either event was
that the statutory meaning attributed to Congress by the Court provided no
support for the prosecution.
The majority’s approach was conspicuously—and deliberately—provin-
cial.  The problem Congress was trying to solve was portrayed, by and large,
just like any domestic question of criminal law.  The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention may have been the catalyst, but to the majority, it was much as if
Congress had come up with the regulation all by itself.  Either way, the Act
should be assessed in light of the intended scope of domestic regulation—
which was not so broad as to implicate every kitchen cupboard or goldfish
bowl.  It also had to be understood in light of its potential to touch on state
powers, as with any other federal criminal legislation.36
At some points, to be sure, the international flavor could be detected,
and not just in the Court’s contrast between mustard gas in World War I and
30 Id. at 2087 (majority opinion).
31 Id. at 2088.
32 Id. at 2088–89 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Variations on these phrasings
are sprinkled throughout the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 2092 (contrasting crimes “not tradi-
tionally . . . left predominantly to the States”).
33 Id. at 2090.
34 Id. at 2091; see also id. at 2093 (reporting that “‘Congress has traditionally been
reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the
States’” (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971))).
35 Id. at 2090, 2092.
36 Id. at 2091, 2093.
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the minor thumb burn inflicted by Bond.37  The Court claimed to “have no
need to interpret the scope of the Convention in this case,”38 but it verged
on doing so indirectly.  It alluded several times to the Convention’s objectives
in attempting to determine the range of chemical weapons concerned,39
albeit while invoking some dictionary definitions unlikely to have been con-
sidered by negotiators40 and supposing that the words in question were really
ones that Congress wrote.41  It also noted that the Convention was supposed
to be implemented in accordance with each state party’s constitutional
processes, as if that indicated deference to U.S. federalism limitations as
opposed to a generic expectation for implementation.42
The majority’s general indifference toward the Convention, however,
necessarily undermined its appreciation of the treaty power.  Because it sup-
posed that the Act, even when narrowly construed, fulfilled the Convention,
there was no gap in application—and keeping the Act aligned with Con-
gress’s usual terrain meant that there was no need explore any constitutional
gap between treaty-enabled and routine authority.  That result was driven,
however, by a statutory presumption that seemed intent on forgetting that a
treaty existed.  Thus the concern for preserving “the Constitution’s balance
between national and local power”43 was reckoned in terms of traditional
federal authority over criminal law; the notion that the nature or quantum of
national power might be affected by a treaty commitment was notably miss-
ing.  But not, at least not entirely, from the concurrences.
B. The Great Divide
The Bond concurrences, in contrast, were premised on the potential
divide between treaty-enabled and routine authority.  Justice Scalia began by
accusing the majority of timidity.  It erred, he argued, not only by laboring
heroically to misconstrue the implementing statute, but also in failing to
“welcome[ ] and eagerly grasp[ ] the opportunity—nay, the obligation—to
37 Id. at 2083.
38 Id. at 2088.
39 Id. at 2090, 2093.
40 Id. at 2090 (quoting Webster’s and American Heritage dictionaries).
41 Id. at 2091.  The words Congress used, the Court elsewhere acknowledged, “closely
track[ed]” those of the Convention. Id. at 2085. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1) (defining
“chemical weapon”), § 229F(8)(A) (defining “toxic chemical”), and § 229F(7) (defining
“purposes not prohibited by this chapter”), with Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, art. II(1)(a), opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21,
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) (defining “Chemical Weapons”), id.
art. II(2) (defining “Toxic Chemical”), and id. art. II(9)(a)–(d) (defining “Purposes Not
Prohibited Under this Convention”).
42 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093. But see id. at 2087 (noting that the Convention was “agnos-
tic between enforcement at the state versus federal level”); cf. id. at 2093 (stating, of the
prosecutorial discretion accorded state officials, that “nothing in the Convention shows a
clear intent to abrogate that feature”).
43 Id. at 2093.
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consider and repudiate” the part of Missouri v. Holland that enabled “the
fundamental constitutional principle of limited federal powers to be set aside
by the President and Senate’s exercise of the treaty power.”44
Justice Scalia divided his constitutional argument into “text” and “struc-
ture,” more or less a depiction of Missouri v. Holland’s mistake followed by a
description of its consequences.  The supposed mistake involved how the
Necessary and Proper Clause syncs with the Treaty Clause.  As Justice Scalia
recounted, the former gives Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof”;45 the latter (one
of the “other Powers”) states that “[the President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.”46  These give Congress the power to
pass laws “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the]
Power . . . to make Treaties,” but this is only a power to “make” laws that help
“make” treaties—like appropriating money for negotiations, authorizing the
hire of negotiators, or even paying for “a bevy of spies” to spy on other poten-
tial signatories—not to implement a treaty that “has been made and is not
susceptible of any more making.”47
This argument was cribbed from Nicholas Rosenkranz,48 who tends to
parse constitutional text with a jeweler’s loupe.49  Whatever its general mer-
its, this approach works poorly for catch-all authority designed for diverse
purposes: asking how the Necessary and Proper Clause was meant to function
with a particular power is like asking how all-purpose flour was intended to
be used for ladyfingers.50  Certainly we can speculate about various combina-
tions of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the treaty power: perhaps the
former has zero relevance to the latter, if the power to “make” a treaty is just
the formal act alone, like the power “[t]o make all [necessary and proper]
Laws” itself;51 perhaps necessary and proper authority can precede and facili-
44 Id. at 2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
46 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
47 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098–99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
48 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867
(2005).
49 For other examples, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010).
50 See Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 MO. L. REV. 1007,
1012–18 (2008) (arguing against Rosenkranz’s approach).
51 Or the President’s power to “make temporary Appointments” (formerly part of Art.
I, § 3), or Congress’s power to “make . . . Regulations” for elections (Art. I, § 4), “make
Rules” regarding captures or for the government and regulation of the military (Art. I,
§ 8), “make” regulations and exceptions concerning jurisdiction (Art. III, § 2), or “make”
needful rules or regulations for U.S. territory and properties (Art. IV, § 3).  It is less clear
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tate the formal act of making treaties, as Professor Rosenkranz and Justice
Scalia would indicate; or perhaps it permits a more generous execution of
the power to make treaties, including their formal conclusion, facilitation,
and implementation.52  Regardless, the question of how the Necessary and
Proper Clause was expected to relate to non-self-executing treaties was
unlikely to have been broadly contemplated at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption, given contemporary expectations that the Supremacy Clause
enables treaties to automatically override state law.53  The resulting conun-
drum—how two clauses of the Constitution were supposed to deal with a
problem that a third clause generally eliminated—is hard to resolve by cut-
ting and pasting text.  Finally, even a diehard textualist has to consider the
other powers “vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States” that Congress might carry into execution, such as the power to ensure
that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”54  It would remain to
be determined whether the legislation was necessary and proper toward that
end, naturally, but less could be categorically excluded.
Justice Scalia was not content, in any case, with a textual argument, but
progressed to concerns about constitutional structure—basically, claims
about consequences.  Congress’s powers were discrete and enumerated.
Through a superficially minor “change to the Constitution’s text,”55 however,
that the power of electors to “make a List” of persons voted for (formerly part of Art. II,
§ 1) would be considered, since such power is not genuinely vested in the U.S. government
or one of its departments or offices.
52 Professor Rosenkranz’s answer is that this would imply “that the President, not Con-
gress, has power to give non-self-executing treaties domestic legal effect, for it is he who has
the ‘Power . . . to make Treaties,’” and thus could not support Congress’s power to imple-
ment.  Rosenkranz, supra note 48, at 1884.  As I have suggested, this is not a radical notion,
since the President is the one who ratifies self-executing treaties, and it is hardly absurd to
imagine that Congress would be vested with a parallel authority for those circumstances
when the President’s authority does not suffice. See Swaine, supra note 50, at 1015.  Nor is
it a powerful rejoinder to suggest that the idea of making treaties was entirely disassociated
from implementation under British practice, see Rosenkranz, supra note 48, at 1884, since
the point of the Supremacy Clause was to change this.  None of this proves, of course, that
the Necessary and Proper Clause was definitely understood to have this broader
significance.
53 It is plausible, certainly, that some might have anticipated a category of treaties that
lacked a private right of action, or that were non-self-executing in the sense that they raised
federal separation-of-powers issues. See DAVID SLOSS, TREATY SUPREMACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE STORY OF AN UNKNOWN CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION (forthcoming
2016) (on file with author).  In any event, the category of non-self-executing treaties, such
as might require separate legislative implementation, was first recognized in Foster v. Neil-
son, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
54 That argument might not satisfy a purist, because the implementing legislation is
then what becomes judicially enforceable—but not, according to many, to the exclusion of
the treaty as some form of supreme law.
55 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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Missouri v. Holland had effected a “seismic”56 change to its structure: with
multilateral treaties touching nearly every subject matter, and at least argua-
bly lacking any subject-matter limitation, “the possibilities of what the Federal
Government may accomplish, with the right treaty in hand, are endless and
hardly farfetched.”57  It might begin with abrogating the Court’s constitu-
tional rulings concerning the limits of the Commerce Clause, as some had
suggested.  Or Congress might be encouraged to interfere with state laws
regarding inheritance.  Despite his disavowal, the particular examples did
seem a little “farfetched”—the Antipolygamy Convention he hypothesized
could just as well have been followed by a Trilateral Fluoridation Charter.58
On a grander scale, he speculated, “Holland places Congress only one treaty
away from acquiring a general police power.”59
The allegation, in any case, was straightforward: the federal government
could, and would, exploit the opportunity to use treaties to enhance its
domestic authority, using international law to bootstrap additional domestic
authority.  This could be avoided by understanding the Necessary and Proper
Clause as irrelevant once a treaty is actually made.  This would, in turn, force
Congress to rely on its Article I, Section 8 powers,60 thereby ensuring an
equivalence for treaty-enabled and routine domestic authority.61
Justice Thomas shared Justice Scalia’s concerns, but wrote separately—
joined by Justices Scalia and Alito—to indicate a separate solution: besides
narrowing the Necessary and Proper Clause, the treaty power itself should be
confined to international matters and excluded from use “to regulate purely
domestic affairs.”62  Preconstitutional practice, echoed in preratification dis-
course, suggested that the constitutional generation understood treaties to
cover matters of international intercourse (including the rights of foreign-
ers), even if subject-matter limitations were not adopted in the new Constitu-
tion.  Early practice, he explained, was largely in accord, and the Court’s
precedents alluded to the treaty power as reaching proper subjects of negoti-
ation—even Missouri v. Holland itself.63  Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
also invoked concerns about an unconstrained treaty power, including its
potential for establishing a general federal police power and “destroy[ing]
the basic constitutional distinction between domestic and foreign powers.”64
A narrowed Necessary and Proper Clause, he reckoned, would not be a suffi-
56 Id.
57 Id. at 2100.
58 To be clear, though, it was not. Id. at 2100–01.
59 Id. at 2101.
60 For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the full panoply of congressional author-
ity—which may not be limited to Article I, Section 8, or even to Article I—as Article I
authority.
61 Subject nonetheless to the possible abuse of self-executing treaties. See infra subsec-
tion III.B.2.
62 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
63 Id. at 2103–09; e.g., id. at 2109 (arguing that “the holding in Holland is consistent
with the understanding that treaties are limited to matters of international intercourse”).
64 Id. at 2103.
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cient safeguard, particularly given the damage that might be done by self-
executing treaties not involving Congress at all.
The precise implications, though, were less clear, perhaps because (as
Justice Thomas noted) the parties had not briefed the question.65  He
acknowledged difficulty in drawing a line “between matters of international
intercourse and matters of purely domestic regulation,”66 and was unclear
even about the nature of some future challenge to a treaty’s constitutional-
ity.67  His discussion was oriented toward as-applied claims, given the evi-
dently international character of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a
whole.  And it seems likely that Justice Thomas intended such a challenge to
run solely to the treaty’s domestic legal significance rather than against the
constitutional capacity of the United States to enter into the treaty in the first
place, though both may be implicated in the treaty power.  Unlike Justice
Scalia, who seemed vexed at the missed opportunity to address the Necessary
and Proper Clause issue, Justice Thomas opined that “[g]iven the increasing
frequency with which treaties have begun to test the limits of the Treaty
Power,” the chance to grapple with the issue “will come soon enough.”68
Justice Alito, finally, agreed with Justice Scalia that Bond had violated
the Act, and that it was therefore necessary to examine the statute’s constitu-
tionality on the basis of the treaty power.  Distinctly, though, he endorsed
only the proposition that “the treaty power is limited to agreements that
address matters of legitimate international concern,” and he sought to apply
that test in the case at hand.69  Justice Alito conceded that in the main, the
Convention addressed a matter of international concern, and suggested no
objection to the treaty’s ratification.  However, he distinguished any treaty
obligation (assumed arguendo) to “enact domestic legislation criminalizing
conduct . . . regulated by the States,” which he said would exceed the treaty
power; that meant, he reasoned, that the Act could not be deemed necessary
and proper to carry into execution the treaty power.70  By reading the treaty
power narrowly, it seemed, he wound up in nearly the same place as would
Justice Scalia’s approach: disabling the capacity of U.S. treaties to upset rou-
tine expectations about the domestic capacity of Congress.
C. The Actual Divide
Reasonable minds differ about the compatibility of modern treaties with
our constitutional tradition, a question beyond the scope of this Article—in
part, because it was only superficially addressed in Bond.  Given the concur-
rences’ claims about the threats treaties pose to constitutional structure, how-
ever, it is worth sketching the competing considerations.
65 Id. at 2103, 2110.
66 Id. at 2110.
67 See id. at 2103 (simply noting interest in addressing the scope of the treaty power “in
an appropriate case”).
68 Id. at 2111.
69 Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
70 Id.
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In fairness, Missouri v. Holland did its best to sound threatening.  Justice
Holmes declared that treaties could reach subjects beyond Congress’s enu-
merated powers, and with little show of effort reported that “[i]f the treaty is
valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” under the
Necessary and Proper Clause71—although he might have been confining
himself to the treaty and statute in question, or treating the matter as settled
by dicta in prior case law.72  It escaped no one, in any event, that the treaty at
issue had been negotiated and ratified in the wake of lower court decisions
holding that pretreaty legislation exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause.73  Those concerned about the opportunistic use of trea-
ties might be forgiven for ignoring the nature of the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention and, stealing a glance in the rearview mirror, seeing the once
receding image of Missouri v. Holland.
All the same, there was surprisingly little attention in any of the Bond
opinions—despite claims about the structural risks of abusive treatymaking—
to the structural checks on federal aggrandizement.  Unlike other forms of
federal power, treaties require a counterparty; it is not a given, for example,
that other states would choose to bind themselves to an Antipolygamy Con-
vention, even if the United States asked nicely.74  Nor are the impediments
limited to what Justice Scalia would call the “making” of a treaty.  For the
federal government to pursue the treaty route, it must not only find an inter-
national co-conspirator, but it must also be willing to accept international
accountability for any breaches, including for transgressions by federal (or
other) actors that can occur even with the right federal legislation on the
books.
Putting these international hurdles to one side, there are domestic ones
to contemplate.  Per Article II, treaties will often be harder to enact than
statutes: the requirement of two-thirds approval by the Senate was a burden
imposed largely in order to safeguard state and local interests.75  And there
71 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
72 See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 147 (1909); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109,
121 (1901); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619 (1842).
73 See Swaine, supra note 50, at 1009.
74 One assumes they would have the good taste to make such a convention bilateral
only.
75 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1342 (2001).  For a survey of other objectives (or, at least, values) it served, see
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution,
80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 760–69 (2002).  Whether or not this degree of caution was appropri-
ate is, for immediate purposes, beside the point; rather, it means simply that the treaty
power was deliberately structured so as to diminish the structural risks now attributed to
them.  It is often observed that the protection afforded state interests may have eroded
over time, including due to the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the direct
election of senators. See id. at 767.  A countervailing development, less often noted, is that
the substantial growth in the size of the Senate has meant that it is easier for treaties to fall
prey to the supermajority rule. See Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 319, 324–30.
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are additional, nonconstitutional obstacles derived from the doctrine of non-
self-execution.  It has become accepted that the President and the Senate
may agree to reservations, understandings, and declarations on behalf of the
United States.  These often temper the scope of international obligations,
but they also frequently declare that the treaty will be regarded as non-self-
executing, including when U.S. courts would otherwise deem the treaty to
establish judicially enforceable obligations.76  The practice of non-self-execu-
tion declarations does suggest—if unaccompanied by substantive reservations
or other means of truncating the international obligation, and if the contem-
plated form of implementation is new federal legislation, as opposed to the
enforcement of existing law—that some combination of enumerated Article I
authorities, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, is likely to be
invoked.  But that necessarily involves separate legislation, subject to bicamer-
alism and presentment, above and beyond consent to the treaty itself.
Viewed one way, legislation implementing a non-self-executing treaty takes
constitutional liberties unlike other legislation; viewed another way, the route
envisions a two-step process that the Founding generation, who consciously
permitted treaties to function as supreme law from the get-go, might con-
sider an additional and burdensome check on federal ambition.
Finally, nothing in enabling necessary and proper authority requires—
one hopes this is obvious—the conclusion that all legislation adopted by
Congress is, in fact, necessary and proper.  The idea that such authority
opens the floodgates depends to an embarrassing (and counterfactual)
degree on the supposition that the courts will disregard its potential limits.
Justice Scalia’s account of an ever-aggrandizing national government must
ultimately suppose that the judiciary is a part of this conspiracy, and construc-
tion of the Necessary and Proper Clause their federalizing tool, which seems
far too modest about the Court’s contrarian potential.77
On the whole, the best caution about Justice Scalia’s diagnosis was the
last authority he cited: Henry St. George Tucker, who, Justice Scalia reported,
“saw clearly the danger of Holland’s ipse dixit five years before it was writ-
ten.”78  Tucker wrote, as Justice Scalia recounted, that:
[The statement is made that] if the treaty-making power, composed of the
President and Senate, in discharging its functions under the government,
finds that it needs certain legislative powers which Congress does not possess
to carry out its desires, it may . . . infuse into Congress such powers,
although the Framers of the Constitution omitted to grant them to Con-
gress. . . . Every reputable commentator upon the Constitution from Story
76 As well as when the result may be overdetermined. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
77 But see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–93 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (indicating that the Affordable Care Act was not justified under
the Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at  2644–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (same).
78 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2102 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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down to the present day, has held that the legislative powers of Congress lie
in grant and are limited by such grant. . . . [S]hould such a construction as
that asserted in the above statement obtain through judicial endorsement,
our system of government would soon topple and fall.79
Invoking Tucker was unsurprising—his work is routinely trotted out to
suggest the radicalism of Missouri v. Holland, so often as to suggest that
Tucker’s own views are singular.80  Still, it was regrettable.  Substantively, the
weaknesses in Tucker’s analysis are obvious.  His contemporary opponents
were clear that their point was not that treaties could infuse Congress with
powers that the Constitution did not provide, as though rewriting Article I,
but rather that the Framers had given the asserted powers to Congress (in the
form of the Necessary and Proper Clause);81 these critics included “reputable
commentators” who addressed directly application of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to the treaty power.82  (His opponents also left to Tucker’s
supporters, mostly, the dirty work of anointing him as a standout defender of
states’ rights and segregation.83)  But Justice Scalia did not cite Tucker’s
79 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER § 113, at 129–30 (1915)).
80 See, e.g., Nick Rosenkranz, The Conventional Wisdom Before Missouri v. Holland: Was It
“Close to Universally Accepted” that a Treaty Could Increase the Legislative Powers of Congress?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:09 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/01/22/the-con
ventional-wisdom-before-missouri-v-holland-was-it-close-to-universally-accepted-that-a-treaty-
could-increase-the-legislative-powers-of-congress/ (citing Henry St. George Tucker’s trea-
tise as the sole example of treatises belying the supposed conventional wisdom preceding
Missouri v. Holland).
81 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER V. STATE POWER
290–92 (1913).
82 See, e.g., CHARLES H. BURR, THE TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES, AND
THE METHODS OF ITS ENFORCEMENT AS AFFECTING THE POLICE POWERS OF THE STATES 386–87
(1912); 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 390, at 139–44 (1902); CORWIN, supra note 81, at 276–95; SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES:
THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 241 (2d ed. 1916); SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRA-
DITION 7, 69 (3d ed. 1885); GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD
AFFAIRS 153–55 (1919); WILLIAM H. TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 67–68, 74, 75–83
(1914); 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 217, at 506–07 (1910); Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the
Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 636, 657, 662–63 (1907); see also
Lindsay Rogers, Book Review, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 595 (1915) (reviewing TUCKER, supra
note 79).
83 Book Review, 49 AM. L. REV. 470, 474–75 (1915) (reviewing TUCKER, supra note 79)
(stating that “Dean Tucker displays on every page his attachment to the older doctrines of
states’ rights and strict construction,” and that “[t]here is a distinct ante bellum flavor to the
work,” but commending his book); Jos. R. Long, Tucker on the Treaty-Making Power, 1 VA. L.
REG. 97, 101 (1915) (reviewing TUCKER, supra note 79) (stating, with appreciation, that
“Mr. Tucker’s book is written frankly from the standpoint of a zealous advocate of states’
rights”).  The basic emphasis on states’ rights and “racial considerations” implicated by the
treaty power was quite evident in Tucker’s work. See Henry St. George Tucker, The Treaty-
Making Power Under the Constitution of the United States, 199 N. AM. REV. 560, 568 (1914); id.
at 563–64 (contrasting limited rights of a “negro citizen of New York” under the laws of
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views as much for their substance as for their supposed prescience.84  On that
score, they were laughably inaccurate.  The “judicial endorsement” Tucker
feared had, in fact, arrived with Missouri v. Holland.  To all appearances, the
system of government is taking its time in toppling and falling.  The more
serious threat, arguably, is what the Bond concurrences endorsed.
III. BREACHING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS (AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS)
The structural concerns highlighted in the Bond opinions—the risk that
absent judicial intervention, the President and the Senate might make trea-
ties beyond those contemplated by the Treaty Clause, or at least occasion
congressional attempts to adopt implementing legislation not legitimate
under the Necessary and Proper Clause—surely warranted the Court’s con-
sideration.  The Founding generation was indeed concerned with the injudi-
cious use of treaties, including as might encroach on the states.85  A fair
reading of constitutional history, however, suggests additional considera-
tions.  One of the most prominent reasons for amending treaty authority as it
stood under the Articles of Confederation was the need to ensure that the
United States could and would fulfill its international obligations—not
merely by making treaties hard to achieve, but also by guaranteeing their
fulfillment, including by the several states.  Beyond that, and mitigating
somewhat the desire to retard treatymaking, there was the goal of endowing
Texas with the rights potentially secured under treaty by “the negro from Hayti or the
Congo,” and concluding that if the rights of aliens might be superior, “we may indeed
repent in sackcloth and ashes that we have sold our birthright for a mess of pottage”).
84 As Professor Galbraith has indicated, Tucker did not actually share Justice Scalia’s
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s function with respect to treaties,
instead believing (for reasons that need not be elaborated here) that it authorized treaty-
implementing legislation and perhaps even required that some treaties be non-self-execut-
ing.  Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 59, 105–07 (2014) (citing TUCKER, supra note 79, at 17, 129–30, 353).  I am not
certain, however, that Tucker’s resistance to the Missouri v. Holland approach is wholly
attributable to his narrow view of the kinds of treaties authorized by the treaty power. See
id. at 107.  Rather, Tucker seemed to employ the panoply of arguments against national
authority—including limits on the scope of the treaty power, and limits in terms of what
would be deemed necessary and proper to implement treaties given the reserved authority
of states—in a fashion not unlike Justice Scalia, once Scalia’s subscription to Justice
Thomas’s concurrence is considered (the principal difference being Justice Scalia’s yet
narrower view of the Necessary and Proper Clause).  Tucker did say that if an unlimited
view of the Treaty Clause were accepted, the “additional concession” that Congress could
pass legislation beyond its enumerated powers “might well be admitted.” See id. at 107
(quoting TUCKER, supra note 79, at 132).  I read him as being sarcastic—given that it
required, in his view, the sense that it would be “appropriate, in order to make the destruc-
tion of the Constitution complete, that Congress should be made its efficient ally in the
process of demolition and have full power to carry out its unlimited demands.” TUCKER,
supra note 79, at 132.
85 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
409–17 (1998).
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the United States with a power to make international agreements compara-
ble to that enjoyed by other civilized nations.86
In the Bond opinions, these other concerns were plumb forgotten, and
the treaty power made to appear as little more than an attractive nuisance for
federal aggrandizers.  This Part will explore the implications of the opinions
for the other values.
A. Thomas-Scalia-Alito Position: Non-“International” International Agreements
As recounted above, three Justices took the position that the treaty
power does not extend to matters of purely domestic regulation, as opposed
to matters of international intercourse.  The other six Justices may or may
not agree, having elected to focus on a statutory rather than constitutional
basis for the decision.  Although the full implications of this view are uncer-
tain, at least in part due to Justice Alito’s implicit disagreement about related
matters, they are unsettling all the same.
This position anticipates the possibility that the United States may
become party to an agreement that exceeds a subject-matter limit imposed by
the Constitution.  Such an agreement may well be genuine and not a sham;
that is, the international concern requirement is distinguishable from a
requirement that the agreement be bona fide, or at least the Restatement
(Third)—in rejecting the former restraint, but acquiescing in the latter—so
supposed.87  One may further assume that the trespass may be innocent or at
most negligent, given that the lines are not discernible.  Justice Thomas
appeared to concede as much, noting that “the distinction between matters
of international intercourse and matters of purely domestic regulation”88 was
not self-evident and that it was unclear whether a treaty could permissibly
reach “some” local matters so long as it related to “intercourse with other
nations.”89  There were other ambiguities, too, that he did not address, such
as whether the proper topics for treaties might evolve or would instead be
frozen as of the Founding (one might make an educated guess as to which
way he leans).  While Justice Thomas held out hope that these issues could be
resolved, perhaps in the case that he predicted would “come soon enough,”90
treaty negotiators might lack guideposts for quite some time.  Justice Scalia,
as noted previously, seemed less optimistic that a suitable case would come
86 For general comment on these objectives, see CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 39–40 (2013); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 175–76 (2d ed. 1996); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and
the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1075, 1089–100, 1102–49 (2000); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State
Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1198–210 (2000).
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302
reporter’s note 2 (1987).
88 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
89 Id. at 2108.
90 Id. at 2111.
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along soon; Justice Thomas’s own conduct might also be cited, seeing how he
hastened to write about the issue in a case when it was not raised.
To this particular prospect—the innocent breach of the Treaty Clause
by U.S. officials genuinely intent on serving the nation’s foreign policy inter-
ests—the Thomas-Scalia-Alito position does not much address itself.  Implic-
itly, the answer is that U.S. officials must, here as elsewhere, respect the
constitutional limits established by the original understanding of the Consti-
tution.  The behavior from which they are supposed to refrain, however, is
obscure, and not just in terms of distinguishing domestic and international
matters.  After noting the Constitution’s “flexibility,” insofar as it (ostensibly)
eliminated the subject-matter limits imposed on treaties by the Articles of
Confederation, Justice Thomas cautioned that “[t]hat understanding of the
Treaty Power did not permit the President and the Senate to exercise domes-
tic authority commensurate with their substantial power over external
affairs.”91  This cryptic passage suggests that the treatymakers may be author-
ized, either by the Constitution or by the nature of sovereignty, to forge trea-
ties not of international concern, so long as it is recognized that such treaties
lack domestic legal effect.
Regardless, there is no evidence that Justice Thomas considered whether
any version of his domestic law views would affect the international validity of
the treaty.  The short answer is that it could not.  Under Article 46 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a violation of domestic law must
be manifest and relate to a rule of fundamental importance; the former, at
least, seems impossible to sustain at any point in the foreseeable future.  An
additional, more important limitation is that the violation must also concern
rules relating to the conclusion of international agreements, as distinct from
rules—however fundamental in character—that merely limit the capacity of
a state to implement an agreement within its domestic system.92
The result of applying the Thomas-Scalia-Alito position and invalidating
domestic implementation, therefore, may put the United States in breach of
internationally (and possibly even constitutionally) valid treaties, despite the
best of intentions of the U.S. treatymakers.  Those negotiating the Chemical
Weapons Convention probably had no idea.  Even negotiators paying heed to
the “international concern” standard during the Restatement (Second)’s heyday
would likely have expected that this was a question for the President and
Senate, rather than the Supreme Court; Justice Thomas’s discussion of prece-
91 Id. at 2106.
92 Reps. of the Comm’n to the Gen. Assembly, Jan. 3, 1966–Jan. 28, 1966, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.1, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 202, 240 (1966).  Although the United
States is not a party to the Convention, it recognizes that much of it coincides with custom-
ary international law.  In particular, the standard described in Article 46 has occasionally
been referenced by U.S. courts and officials. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United
States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1310 n.23 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Article 46 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Senate Hearings,
1986, 1981–1988 DIGEST § 42, at 1229, 1238 (statement by Assistant Secretary of State for
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs endorsing the rule expressed in Article 46).
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dent revealed no case in which the Court had struck down a statute or treaty
on that basis.93  Reviewing the evidence he cited of the original understand-
ing and early practice, one could more easily gather the impression that this
question was not one for which judicial review was ever contemplated.
B. Scalia-Thomas Position: International (but Not Interstate) Agreements
At first blush, the position established by the concurring opinions by
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, once synthesized, is pleasingly symmetri-
cal: treaties may lack (some form of) validity because they exceed the treaty
power, per Justice Thomas, and they may likewise exceed Congress’s power
to implement, per Justice Scalia.  This seems sounder than if the capacity to
reliably enter treaties exceeded the power to implement them—if, for
instance, Justice Scalia’s concurrence alone had been published.94  Even so,
the Scalia-Thomas position creates some substantial hazards that have
received no attention.
1. Non-Self-Executing Agreements
The symmetry of the Scalia-Thomas position begins to erode when the
implementation and validity tests are compared.  As concerns implementa-
tion, recall that Congress has legislative authority only to the extent of Article
I.  Validity’s contours are somewhat more elastic.  It likewise seeks to prevent
the national government from assuming boundless authority.  But Justice
Thomas did not suggest—and could not have maintained—that the treaty
power goes only so far as Article I does.  Long-settled debates about the House of
Representatives’ role in treaties touching on Article I would have taken on a
different complexion, for example, had it been clear that this amounted to
the entirety of the treaty power.  And Justice Thomas said with conviction
that Missouri v. Holland itself would have satisfied his test—despite his likely
sympathy for the lower court’s holding that similar pretreaty legislation was
beyond congressional authority.95  There is daylight, in short, between the
minimum required for a treaty to be “international,” on the one hand, and
the maximum authority permitted under Justice Scalia’s conception of
implementing authority, on the other.
How should treatymakers anticipate and adjust to this gap?  The risk-
averse approach would be to refrain from any treaty requiring implementing
legislation that potentially exceeds the Scalia-Thomas bar—on the possibility
that their view, which has never been enforced by a U.S. court, might some-
93 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2108–10 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
94 None in fact endorsed Scalia’s position without favoring the Thomas position as
well, and one might imagine that the desire to avoid such a discrepancy drove Justice
Thomas to reach out to address the treaty power.  But he may instead have taken the view
that state and local implementation of treaties—unburdened by a federal obligation—was
perfectly satisfactory. See infra.
95 See supra text accompanying note 63 (citing Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2109 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
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day become the law.  Of course, the treatymakers might go ahead, adopting
federal legislation and ratifying the treaty, if they had a good faith belief that
the treaty satisfied the international concern test and that implementing leg-
islation were constitutional.  The risk that a court may later find a political
decision unconstitutional might not seem particularly substantial or unusual.
But the distinctive risk, again, is that the United States would remain party, at
least for a time, to an international obligation that it may be breaching.96
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia might stress a third option, in which
treatymakers could depend on states and localities to discharge U.S. treaty
obligations, either through existing laws or through new laws tailored to the
treaty.  Contemporary jurisprudence illustrates the unavoidable risks:
whatever the general application of anticommandeering principles to the
treaty power, the national government must lack the capacity to direct state
legislatures or officials when it lacks implementing authority itself; whatever
the prospects that a state already has or may adopt implementing law on its
own initiative, there is limited recourse against it if those laws are repealed.97
Voluntary compliance by states with treaty obligations was one thing the
Constitution was supposed to avoid, so it seems doubtful that the Founding
generation expected the treatymakers to proceed on such contingencies.
Nor have the treatymakers done so.  The period between Missouri v. Holland
and Bond has been among the most fertile for international agreements in
human history—though doubtless more will enter into force before the views
expressed in the concurrences become governing law—and U.S.
treatymakers established obligations predicated upon a much wider range of
options for fulfilling them.  There will be greater caution, one hopes, before
such a gap is actually, and retroactively, imposed in relation to treaties under-
taken on a different premise.
2. Self-Executing Agreements
Consider, on the other hand, self-executing treaties, ones that in princi-
ple are directly enforceable by the judiciary.98  Because these do not require
implementing legislation, they do not directly implicate Article I limits on
congressional action.  But do they automatically establish binding domestic
law, irrespective of whether they fail an international concern test?
Here it is useful to disaggregate the Scalia-Thomas position.  Justice
Thomas cut self-executing treaties no slack.  On his view, their exclusion of
96 The Court has never clarified whether the President has plenary or exclusive power
to terminate a treaty commitment—particularly in the event there is no termination provi-
sion in the agreement itself—but it is clear that this is not a judicial power and that courts
likely have no capacity to order such redress. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979).
97 See generally Swaine, supra note 21.
98 The nature of self-execution and its consequences are complex, controversial, and
changing.  The account here is broadly consistent with that in current drafts of the Restate-
ment (Fourth) on Foreign Relations. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 106 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014).
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any role for the House makes the political and constitutional hazards of a
“treaty-based police power” more profound, if anything.99  What this meant
for their legal force, in the event they run afoul of the international concern
test, was not spelled out, but it did not appear especially favorable.
Justice Scalia’s position was more difficult to pin down.  In solidarity with
Justice Thomas, he did not concede that “the power to make self-executing
treaties is limitless.”100  At the same time—perhaps in solidarity with Profes-
sor Rosenkranz, whose denatured Necessary and Proper Clause naturally had
no bearing on self-executing treaties101—Justice Scalia said that confining his
constitutional objection to non-self-executing treaties might make “a great
deal of sense.”102  His idea was that self-executing treaties were less tempting
and feasible, insofar as they required the President and a Senate
supermajority to agree on a set of extremely specific stipulations such as
would require no legislation, whereas a non-self-executing treaty was both
easier to agree on and could license later modification and even repeal.103
This argument was sketched only briefly, and its difficulties can be stated
equally briefly.  There are, to be sure, reasons why the United States may
prefer other means of domestic aggrandizement—not simply due to the rela-
tive difficulty of achieving domestic consensus on a detailed and prescriptive
treaty, but also due to concerns about agreeing to a detailed code that other
states may invoke against it.  At the same time, equating self-execution with a
treaty’s detail, let alone the preferences of U.S. actors for that detail, is sim-
plistic.  The premise that “the President and the Senate [can] find in some
foreign state a ready accomplice”104 to their preferences assumes an
extraordinary degree of control over matters in which other parties will take
an acute interest, and seems particularly dubious for any multilateral instru-
ment.  Beyond that, the supposition that the self-executing or non-self-exe-
cuting character of a treaty provision is dictated internationally, by
negotiated text, is highly contestable.  Traditionally, courts have exercised
considerable judgment in the matter, based on tests in which text is an
important but nonexclusive consideration, applied in ways—and with conse-
99 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  The premise was
that self-executing treaties “would circumvent the role of the House of Representatives in
the legislative process.” Id.  But circumvention is an odd way of putting it, given that self-
executing treaties were contemplated by the Constitution; non-self-executing treaties may
be better understood as affording the lagniappe of an additional, extraconstitutional check
on lawmaking rather than as establishing a constitutional floor.
100 Id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  It is not clear that anyone said
they were limitless.
101 See Rosenkranz, supra note 48, at 1928 (stressing that “a treaty that goes beyond
enumerated powers may always be self-executing”).
102 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
103 Id. at 2102.
104 Id.
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quences—that other actors have found difficult to predict.105  Any control by
the President and Senate over this inquiry is more likely to follow negotia-
tions and express itself through declarations and other unilateral pronounce-
ments rather than text, and remains subject to judicial evaluation.106
To the extent one does envision control over this question by the Presi-
dent and Senate, the path remains unclear.  It is unclear as of now whether—
even if one were to accept the Scalia-Thomas position en toto—self-execut-
ing treaties would equally be subject to Article I limits relating to their
domestic force, like non-self-executing treaties once the Necessary and
Proper Clause is shackled.  Inquiring minds will find it difficult to determine
via independent study; because the textual argument for limiting non-self-
executing treaties is unavailable for self-executing treaties, the question turns
on what Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia regard as “structural” considera-
tions—which have not, as of yet, been comprehensively developed.  The
treatymakers may or may not pay close attention to the characterization of a
treaty as self-executing, at least not as it relates to the constitutional capacity
to implement the treaty domestically, and they may be unable to identify the
treaty’s nature prior to signature even if they wished.  The structural objective
of establishing a treaty power permitting the United States to enter into trea-
ties that it knows it can discharge is largely undermined.
C. Alito Position
Justice Alito focused exclusively on the limitation of treaties to matters of
international concern.  If a provision of a non-self-executing treaty proves to
exceed the treaty power, implementing legislation is ipso facto not necessary
and proper.  If, on the other hand, legislation implements a provision of
international concern, legislation may be necessary and proper—or so he
implies, in withholding his approval from Justice Scalia’s more restrictive
view.107  As a result, Justice Alito’s position admits of no necessary gap
between a valid treaty of international concern and domestic constitutional
authority, since a valid treaty might enable authority not stipulated as an enu-
merated power.
This synchronized view—in which the selfsame reasons that inhibit the
international authority of the United States inhibit its domestic implement-
ing authority, rendering it not necessary and proper—is relatively appealing,
but not without complications.  The principal, familiar one involves the test
for international concern, which Justice Alito depicts as taking an as-applied,
provision-by-provision form; he also makes domestic constitutionality depend
completely upon that inquiry.  Someone considering the Scalia-Thomas posi-
105 See Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508–23 (2008).  For prior attention to even
more factors, see Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373–76 (7th
Cir. 1985), and People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
106 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 735 (2004)).
107 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tion might, in theory, be able to predict whether a non-self-executing obliga-
tion is domestically enforceable by looking at domestic jurisprudence on the
scope of Article I.  If the statutory provision falls within Article I authority, it
is enforceable without regard to the treaty; if it does not, it is unenforceable
without regard to the international concern inquiry.
Those instead limited to the objection described in Justice Thomas’s
concurrence, like Justice Alito, will excuse an additional class of agreements
lying beyond Article I.  For their pains, however, they will be forced to con-
centrate on whether a treaty provision and its implementing legislation is
nonetheless sufficiently devoted to international intercourse—a question
never resolved by the Supreme Court.  Justice Thomas himself did not even
hazard an answer, ultimately deciding to await an appropriate case to settle
his thoughts.108  Only Justice Alito seemed to apply the inquiry in Bond itself,
stating simply that the indicted behavior was “typically . . . the sort of conduct
regulated by the States” and thus neither a matter of legitimate international
concern nor within the Necessary and Proper Clause.109  Unlike Justice
Scalia’s inquiry, moreover, the “international concern” test is sui generis, and
dependent entirely on developing a treaty-specific jurisprudence.  Consider-
ing Justice Scalia’s impatience with the majority’s decision to postpone reso-
lution of his constitutional question, the wait for clarity on Justice Alito’s
position—whether it will be adopted, and how it will evolve in reaction to
particular facts—will be longer yet.
D. Majority Position
As recounted previously, Chief Justice Roberts (and five others) took the
view that the statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention could
be narrowly read, thus avoiding resolution of the constitutional objection.
Generalized, the majority envisioned the possibility that treaty-implementing
statutes will be narrowly construed (theoretically, only if they are ambiguous)
and decoupled from an international commitment—both as the obligation is
recognized under international law and as may be valid according to the
Treaty Clause.  It did so not in order to remedy a concrete constitutional
deficiency, but rather due to something more like a colorable concern.
Nominally, such an approach avoids entangling the Court unnecessarily
in constitutional questions.  But this decoupling directly challenges some of
the foundational values motivating the Constitution’s redesigned treaty
power, including the importance of ensuring state compliance and reinforc-
ing the United States’ capacity to make credible international commitments.
It is also a curious result as a matter of legislative intent.  It was not especially
hard to imagine that Congress was behaving unconventionally with regard to
the allocation of federal and state power, given the United States’ obligations
under the Convention.  And if it matters whether Congress genuinely appre-
ciates the interpretive approaches courts will take to its statutes—the better
108 Id. at 2110–11 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
109 Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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to gauge its druthers in construing unclear language—surely it should matter
that Congress legislated, as it has for some time, with an appreciation of Mis-
souri v. Holland.  After Bond, however, its expectations will be harder to
reckon, as to both the anticipated limits of national authority and the spirit
in which its legislation will be read.
CONCLUSION
In a recent case, facing the argument that a Supreme Court decision
upholding a statute touching on the status of Jerusalem might cause serious
international controversy, Justice Scalia suggested that if it was within Con-
gress’s power, it should make no difference whether a statute antagonized
foreign countries.  As he saw the matter, it fell to Congress, rather than to the
Court, to worry about the consequences.110  This put the cart before the
horse: the question was precisely whether the problem was one for Congress
in the first place, or fell to the President instead, and the Court will be assum-
ing some responsibility for the consequences when it decides which is the
appropriate decisionmaker.
Bond suggested that Justice Scalia and his colleagues are much more
overt in assuming responsibility for evaluating what they regard as structural,
constitutional consequences of other foreign relations assignments—while
also, more as Justice Scalia indicated, avoiding reflection on other constitu-
tional implications of their preferences.  At least when it comes to the treaty
power, such distinctions are artificial and counterproductive.  Regarding the
validity of treaties, and the validity of implementing legislation, those writing
in Bond—and, equally, those remaining silent—should have reflected much
more carefully on why the Constitution’s clearest direction to the judiciary
on treaties was that it should enforce them.
110 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. Nov. 3,
2014).
